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Abstract In this paper, we exploit pension reform-induced changes in retirement
eligibility requirements to assess the role of grandparental childcare availability in the
labor force participation of women with children under 15. Our analysis shows that,
among the women studied, those whose ownmothers are retirement eligible have a 11%
higher probability of being in the labor force than those whose mothers are ineligible.
The pension eligibility of maternal grandfathers and paternal grandparents, however, has
no significant effect on the women’s labor force participation. We also demonstrate that
the eligibility of maternal grandmothers mainly captures the effect of their availability
for childcare. Hence, pension reforms, by potentially robbing households of an
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important source of flexible, low-cost childcare, could have unintended negative con-
sequences for the employment rates of women with young children.
JEL Classification J13 . J22
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1 Introduction
Given the progressive population aging in developed countries, increasing female labor
force participation (hereafter, LFP) and employment are paramount if Europe is to meet its
2020 target of 75% employment among those aged 20–64, a necessary objective for
boosting economic growth and ensuring national pension system sustainability.
Achieving this goal involves narrowing the employment gender gap, which to different
degrees is still substantial in all EUmember states but especially high in Southern European
countries. In fact, a recent OECD (2012) analysis of labor market gender gaps reports 2011
male versus female employment rates in the 15–64 age group of 65.9 versus 45.1% in
Greece, 64.1 versus 52.8% in Spain, and 67.5 versus 46.5% in Italy.
Although several explanations are proposed for the low labor force attachment of
women in Southern European countries, the most cited are cultural influences like the
“male breadwinner model” and institutional constraints (which, in turn, may also reflect
cultural influences). Among the latter, the lack of publicly provided childcare is stressed
as a major barrier to women’s reconciliation of family with career (Del Boca and Vuri
2007; Del Boca and Sauer 2009). In Italy, for instance, public expenditure on childcare
accounts for a tiny 0.2% of GDP, which is half of the average OECD-30 expenditure
(see Fig.x 1). Unfortunately, the need to cope with tight budgetary constraints after the
Great Recession has prevented most Southern European countries from increasing the
funds allocated to family policies and thus hampered any substantial progress in raising
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Fig. 1 Public expenditure on childcare and early education services, percent of GDP, 2011. Source: OECD
Family Database (http://www.oecd.org/social/family/database.htm), chart PF3.1
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female employment. It is therefore likely that in a context of low or even shrinking
public childcare provision, grandparents (and relatives in general) may serve as an
important source of affordable childcare for working women. According to Hank and
Buber (2009), for instance, about 32% of European grandmothers are engaged in
regular childcare (i.e., almost weekly or more often) with percentages in countries such
as Greece, Italy, and Spain almost twice as large as those in Scandinavia. In Italy, a
survey run by the Italian National Statistical Institute (ISTAT) in 2005 shows that
grandparents remain the main source of childcare when the mother is working. Among
1–2-year-old children of working mothers, about half (52.3%) are looked after by
grandparents, 13.5% are enrolled in public nurseries, 14.3% in private nurseries, and
9.2% looked after by nannies (ISTAT 2005). In this paper, we assess whether grand-
parents’ potential availability for childcare, proxied by their meeting pension eligibility
requirements, has a positive effect on female, and especially maternal, labor force
participation.1 This question is relevant not only in light of the widespread structural
underinvestment in public childcare in many European countries, but also the recent
pension reforms introduced in many EU member states. These reforms, by setting
stricter retirement eligibility requirements, may have unintended consequences on
female employment. For example, we show that raising retirement age and years of
contributions, by reducing the supply of low-cost, flexible, informal childcare provided
by grandparents, can reduce the labor force participation of mothers. Hence, pension
reforms that are not coupled with sufficient investment in public childcare may further
exacerbate the already wide intergenerational and gender gaps in employment by
reducing the employment of young women relative not only to older women but also
to young men, who traditionally bear less of the childcare burden.
The case of Italy is ideal for studying how changes in pension eligibility
impact labor force participation because in recent years it has undergone several
pension reforms that have gradually increased retirement requirements. For
instance, whereas prior to 1992, the 20-year accumulated contribution rule
allowed many public sector workers to retire in their 40s or early 50s, since
then several pension reforms have gradually increased the number of years of
contributions required for seniority-based retirement, and raised the minimum
age required for age-based retirement to 65. These pension eligibility rules,
which vary over time and according to such factors as gender and employment
sector, provide an arguably exogenous variation (see also, Bottazzi et al. 2006;
Battistin et al. 2009, 2015; Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-Fernandez 2015) used in
this paper to identify the effect of grandparental childcare availability on mater-
nal employment.
Our estimates show that mothers of cohabiting children under 15 whose own
mothers are eligible for retirement have a 7.1 percentage point higher proba-
bility of labor force participation (+ 11%) than those whose mothers are not yet
eligible. We interpret this result to mean that grandparental availability for
childcare facilitates the labor force participation of women with young children.
1 In this paper, we use the term “women” to refer to the females whose labor force status is being investigated.
Although both parents and parents-in-law are sometimes collectively referred to as “grandparents” (adopting
the perspective of the women’s children), the women’s “mother” and “father” are specifically designated as
“maternal grandmother” and “maternal grandfather,” respectively, while the “mother-in-law” and “father-in-
law” are labeled “paternal grandmother” and “paternal grandfather.”
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This interpretation is confirmed by the absence of any such effect for men or
for women with no cohabiting children under 15, but a large effect for women
with very young children, who have the most intensive childcare needs, and for
low-educated mothers or mothers in small municipalities, who have fewer
childcare alternatives available in the market. Our baseline results are also
robust to several sensitivity checks; in particular, accounting for potential
sample selection issues into having a cohabiting child aged 0–14, considering
employment instead of LFP, and including controls for additional pathways
through which grandparental retirement eligibility may affect female LFP
(e.g., income and wealth transfers).
Our paper complements the evidence in Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-Fernandez
(2015) by exploiting seniority-eligibility rules in addition to age-eligibility rules.
This is a nonnegligible improvement because past research has shown that
individuals tend to retire as soon as possible (Behaghel and Blau 2012;
Gruber and Wise 2007), and reforms increasing age requirements may cause
a “run to seniority pension” (Brugiavini and Peracchi 2012; Ardito 2017)
increasing the relative incidence of seniority vis-à-vis old-age pensions. As a
consequence, the age-eligibility rules exploited in previous papers are likely to
be binding only for those grandparents who did not or could not use the
seniority rules such as late labor market entrants (e.g., highly educated individ-
uals), grandparents with very discontinuous working lives, or those who did not
have to provide childcare (see Rupert and Zanella 2014). The potential
endogeneity of individuals’ seniority-based eligibility is addressed (i) by con-
trolling for a large set of determinants of grandparents’ retirement eligibility
available in our data (age, gender, education, and employment sector and type),
so that our preferred model is only identified by changes in the retirement rules
mandated by pension reforms; and (ii) by not using grandparents’ actual years
of pension contributions to compute seniority eligibility, but imputing years of
contributions based on the average behavior of individuals with the same
characteristics. Our results point to the importance of exploiting both sources
of eligibility. Indeed, our estimated effects are substantially larger than the
comparable (reduced form) estimates reported by Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-
Fernandez (2015), especially on the sample of women with younger children (−
15 percentage point vs. − 3 percentage point). This difference leads to markedly
different conclusions and policy implications on the importance of grandparent-
provided childcare.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews
the most relevant empirical literature and highlights our main contributions.
Section 3 gives a brief history of the Italian pension laws, whose nature assures
exogenous variation in grandparental availability for childcare, and describes our
empirical strategy. Section 4 describes the data used in our empirical analysis, and
Section 5 investigates the relation between pension eligibility and retirement
status. Section 6 reports our primary analytical results while the outcomes of
several robustness checks are described in an appendix, after which Section 7
reports some back-of-the-envelope calculations of the potential effect of pension
laws on maternal aggregate employment. Section 8 summarizes the main findings
and concludes the paper.
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2 Related literature
The estimation of the causal effect of grandparent-provided childcare on
women’s labor supply is fraught with several identification challenges (see
Zanella 2017 for a recent review of the literature). One major identification
problem is that a simple OLS regression of maternal labor supply on
grandparent-provided childcare may lead to biased estimates because this latter
is unlikely to be exogenous with respect to the former. At the same time, both
the reverse causality of grandparents providing childcare because a woman
works and the simultaneous existence of unobservable (or unobserved) charac-
teristics (e.g., grandparental health) that affect female labor supply behavior and
informal childcare availability may lead to spurious correlation. One previously
attempted solution to this identification issue leverages the arguably exogenous
variation in grandparent-provided childcare generated by either the grandpar-
ents’ being alive or their retirement eligibility. 2 For example, Arpino et al.
(2014) employ data from the 2003 wave of the ISTAT multipurpose “Family
and Social Subjects Survey” (FSSS), which collects information on a mother’s
use of grandparental childcare. By instrumenting the latter with grandparents
being alive or not, these authors estimate that using grandparent-provided
childcare raises a mother’s likelihood of being in the labor market by 32.3
percentage points.3 In earlier work, Posadas and Vidal-Fernandez (2013) apply a
similar identification strategy to US panel data to demonstrate a positive effect
on women’s LFP. Their instrumental variable (IV) estimates, however, are much
lower (14.6 percentage points) and less precise (p value = 0.29) than those
reported by Arpino et al. (2014) for Italy, partly perhaps because of the two
countries’ different institutional settings.4
Neither of these studies, however, takes into account that surviving grand-
parents may greatly differ in the amount of time they can devote to childcare,
an aspect acknowledged in two recent papers that exploit differences in grand-
parental labor market participation generated by changes in retirement eligibility
rules. In the first, Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-Fernandez (2015; hereafter, AFVF)
use age-based pension eligibility as an identification source in three waves
2 Other studies proxy grandparental availability for childcare by exploiting variations in their geographic
proximity based on the assumption that the closer the grandparents live to their children or children-in-law, the
more available they are for childcare (e.g., Compton and Pollak 2014). However, residential choices of both
the women and their grandparents may be endogenous. Women who are more labor market oriented, for
instance, may more greatly value living close to their parents and having a potential source of low-cost
childcare. The same criticism applies to studies that examine the effect on women’s labor market outcomes of
grandparents residing with the family (Leibowitz et al. 1992; Ogawa and Ermisch 1996; Abendroth et al.
2012) without addressing this arrangement’s potential endogeneity. Compton and Pollak (2014) address this
endogeneity issue by using a sample of military wives whose husbands’ locations are determined by the
military. They offer some evidence that military wives residing in their birth state are more likely to be in the
labor force.
3 A similar strategy, although not in an IV setting, was already employed by Del Boca (2002) using data from
the Survey on Household Income and Wealth (SHIW). The author proxies informal childcare availability by
reports of at least one grandparent being alive, which she then links positively to maternal participation in
Italy’s labor force.
4 Based on their individual fixed effects estimates, which they deem the most reliable, Posadas and Vidal-
Fernandez (2013) report that grandparental childcare increases women’s LFP by 9 percentage points.
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(1998, 2003, and 2009) of the FSSS to investigate the effect of grandparental
pension eligibility on female fertility and LFP. Using a two-sample, two-stage
least squares estimator, they show that the maternal grandmother’s LFP de-
creases her daughter’s LFP by 21.4 percentage point in the whole sample.
Focusing on grandmother’s LFP instead of grandparent-provided childcare im-
plies that their estimate could simultaneously capture alternative mechanisms,
namely both grandparent-provided childcare and financial transfers, which may be
used by women to buy external childcare. Indeed, the authors explain the surpris-
ingly lower effect (14 percentage point) of grandmother’s LFP for the restricted
sample of women with children under 3, whose childcare needs are presumably
greater, as an indication of working grandmothers transferring more resources to
their daughters. The authors also estimate a reduced form model in which the
grandmother’s lack of pension eligibility is directly included in her daughter’s
LFP. These estimates, which are comparable with those presented in our paper,
produce − 5.1 percentage point and − 3.4 percentage point effects for the whole
and restricted samples, respectively. In the other study, which uses only the 2009
wave of the FSSS, Battistin et al. (2015) exploit pension reform-generated exoge-
nous variation to demonstrate a positive effect of grandparental retirement eligibility
on female fertility. To explore potential channels for this effect, they also assess the
impact of grandparental pension eligibility on employment, reporting estimated
effect ranges between 4 and 2.5 percentage points that are concentrated among
women under 35 and decrease with a woman’s age.
It is important to highlight certain potential weaknesses in the previous
literature using IV estimation. First, instrumental variables require not only that
the excluded instruments be exogenous but also that the so-called exclusion
restriction assumption hold. The latter implies, for instance, that grandparental
deaths should not affect female LFP through channels other than informal
childcare provision, conditional on the variables included in the regressions.
This assumption may fail in our setting because the monetary transfers that a
woman (or her partner) receives from her parents or in-laws—whose effect on
her nonlabor income varies her LFP incentives—will likely depend on whether
these relatives are alive (dead) or (non)employed. In the case of Posadas and
Vidal-Fernandez (2013) and Arpino et al. (2014), for instance, in order for the
exclusion restriction to hold, women with deceased parents (in-laws) must have
the same nonlabor income availability as those whose parents (in-laws) are still
alive. In reality, however, such may not be the case. On the one hand, early loss of a
parent (in-law) may entail lower wealth accumulation and lower expected intervivo
transfers and inheritances, generating an income or wealth effect on labor supply. On
the other hand, if one parent (or in-law) dies, a woman may immediately receive
some wealth in the form of inheritance, which could soften household budget
constraints, especially when capital markets are imperfect, and the additional re-
sources might partly be used to buy costly external childcare. Thus, the effect of cash
and wealth transfers may reinforce or countervail that of grandparent-provided
childcare, although in general, it is difficult to assess the bias of the estimates ex-
ante when this channel is neglected.
The IV strategy used by AFVF (2015), which estimates the effect of
grandmother’s LFP, like we already stressed mixes the effects of childcare
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and monetary and wealth transfers. Since the authors have no information on
such variables, they can only estimate a “gross” effect. In this respect, our data
set permits us to include explicit proxies of intervivo transfers and inheritance
received by the women and their partners (Section 6.2), allowing us to disen-
tangle the childcare provision channel from other potential effects of grandpa-
rental pension eligibility.
Other contributions with respect to the extant literature include the fact that
although our identification strategy is similar to that in AFVF (2015), ours uses
both age-based retirement pension and contribution-year-based seniority pension
rules to define grandparental pension eligibility. At the same time, in contrast to
Battistin et al. (2015), our definition of retirement pension eligibility does not
assume continuous working lives which, although probably innocuous for
grandfathers, could lead to a substantial overestimation of grandmother eligibil-
ity given the share of mothers who experience career interruptions or even
permanent exit from the labor market around childbearing (Pronzato 2009). 5
Any such overestimation (or underestimation) of grandparental eligibility (a
misclassification error) may lead to an attenuation bias in the estimates
(Lewbel 2007). Battistin et al. (2015) also use retrospective data to reconstruct
lifecycle labor supply, which, as the authors acknowledge, may be problematic
for analyzing labor market behavior because of possible recall errors. By
considering only information on mothers’ current employment, we minimize
the impact of this recall bias.
A further more substantive difference from both AFVF (2015) and Battistin
et al. (2015) is that instead of considering the effect on LFP of all women, we
focus only on mothers. Although both effects are of interest, they are poten-
tially different. Our study thus throws light on the potential effect of raising
retirement eligibility requirements on the LFP of women who are already
mothers via deprivation of grandparental childcare. Previous research, in con-
trast, estimates the labor supply effect as the average effect on the whole
female population, both mothers and nonmothers. This average effect, however,
could differ if, for instance, the reforms induced the former to decrease LFP in
response to losing grandparental childcare but motivated the latter to postpone
or reduce fertility and so increase their labor supply. 6 The total effect on
women’s LFP would then be ambiguously signed. Other important differences
are our inclusion of women with deceased grandparents and allowance for
differential effects on maternal LFP of the childcare availability of grandparents
who never worked versus those who worked and are now pension eligible. As
discussed in the next section, we expect these two grandparental caregiver types
to have very different effects on female LFP, a theoretical prediction that is
indeed supported by the empirical analysis (see Section 7).
5 Also problematic is neglecting employment sector and type and/or applying private sector rules to all
grandmothers, since it leads to a less precise measure of retirement eligibility.
6 Some recent studies using presumably exogenous variation in motherhood or family size to estimate the
“motherhood” or “child” penalty include Bailey (2006), Cruces and Galiani (2007), Cristia (2008), and
Càceres-Delpiano (2012).
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3 Using pension reforms to identify the effect of grandparental childcare
3.1 A brief history of pension reforms in Italy
Three major reforms were implemented in Italy during the 1990s to control severe
imbalances in the public pension system. Prior to 1992, both retirement requirement
and benefit amounts were very generous, with private sector workers allowed to retire
at 60 (55 for women) with at least 15 years of contributions (age-based retirement
pension) or after 35 years of contributions, independent of age (seniority pension).7 The
amount of the benefit was based both on contributory years and earnings received
during the last working years, with a private sector worker receiving 2% of the average
earnings of the last 5 years before retirement for every year of contribution paid. The
steep earning profiles of most workers resulted in very generous benefits, leading to a
record 1992 benefits/GDP ratio of 16%, which raised the issue of system sustainability
and triggered changes in the retirement age and benefits of current and future workers.
In the more general framework of public deficit reduction, the first emergency
attempt to balance the pension system budget was the so-called Amato reform
(D.Lgs.503/1992), which gradually increased both age and contribution requirements
by 5 years. Two years later, the Dini reform (L.724/1994 and L.335/1995) reorganized
the system so substantially as to imply a transition from earnings-based to contribution-
based benefit computation while decreasing the age requirement but increasing the
contribution requirement. It also introduced and regulated a parallel (voluntary) private
pension system, which, however, applied only to individuals starting their first job after
1995 or voluntarily opting for the new system.8 Finally, the Prodi reform (L.449/1997)
modified the part of the Dini reform targeted at older workers, slightly increasing the
age requirements and harmonizing the rules for public and private sector employees
and self-employed workers.
Table 1 summarizes the minimum age and contribution requirements set by the
different reforms for private employees, public employees, and self-employed
workers, which we use in the paper to define individual eligibility for a state
pension.9 As previously explained, workers had some discretion in choosing the
requirements-benefits scheme, so for each of the three laws, we report the mini-
mum requirements for every year (half-year for those enacted by July 1) according
to gender and employment sector and type. The first column refers to the 1992
Amato reform; the second to the 1995 Dini reform for older workers, as modified
by the 1997 Prodi reform; and the third to the 1995 Dini reform for the most
recent cohorts of workers. These latter requirements are relevant because older
individuals could opt for this system. To illustrate, before the 1992 Amato reform,
a 62-year-old male working in the public sector with 30 years of contributions was
pension eligible based on both age (60 for public sector workers) and seniority
(20 years for public sector workers). In 1993, after the Amato reform, an identical
individual was eligible only for a seniority pension because the retirement age had
7 Requirements for public sector workers were even more generous (see Table 1).
8 Only in 2012 (Fornero reform, D.L.201/2011) was the contribution-based system (partially) extended to all
workers. This reform, however, is outside our period of analysis.
9 Workers in certain sectors (e.g., arduous or hazardous jobs like mining or long-distance driving) might have
different requirements, but we disregard these in our paper.
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been raised. After 1996, an individual with the same characteristics would have
been ineligible based on age (Amato), contribution years (Dini-Prodi), or both
(Dini). Hence, consistent with the opportunity to choose the requirement, we
assume that workers are eligible for a state pension whenever they satisfy at least
one of the three criteria.
3.2 Empirical strategy
Although we seek to reveal how grandparental childcare determines mothers’ LFP, our
data contain no information on whether and howmuch time grandparents spend with their
grandchildren (a variable that would anyway be endogenous to women’s labor market
outcomes). Therefore, rather than directly relating women’s employment to grandparental
childcare, we correlate the mothers’ LFP with their parents’ and in-laws’ potential
availability for childcare by estimating a linear probability model of the following form:
yit ¼ αþ ∑4k¼1 βk1NWkit þ βk2ELkit þ βk3NELkit
 þ γ 0X it þ τ rt þ uit ð1Þ
where yit is a dummy capturing whether woman i is in the labor force or not in year t.
Our main variables of interest are the three dummy variables NWkit;EL
k
it;NEL
k
it which
capture the potential availability for childcare of each relative k = 1,… 4, when 1 and 2
are the woman’s mother and mother-in-law, respectively, and 3 and 4, her father and
father-in-law. More specifically, NWkit is equal to 1 if individual k is alive and has never
worked (i.e., has always been out of the labor force) and 0 otherwise, and ELkit NEL
k
it
 
is an indicator variable equal to 1 if individual k is alive and (in)eligible for a state
pension (based on the pension eligibility rules outlined in the previous subsection). If
individual k is not alive, all three variables take the value 0. We also control for all time
variant region-specific factors that might affect female employment by including region
by year fixed effects (τrt), which, among other things, capture differences in the
socioeconomic environment (e.g., unemployment) and public childcare provision.
Finally, Xit is a vector of individual-level variables that may also affect women’s labor
supply and employment, including age and education of individual i, and her parents
and in-laws, partner’s income and education, and size of the municipality of residence.
In the most saturated version of the model, this vector also includes the grandparents’
employment sector (private or public) and type (employee or self-employed).
We exploit two sources of variation to identify the effect of interest: The first is cross-
sectional variation determined by differences in the grandparents’ gender, education, and
employment sector and type. These latter are generally associated with different ages of
entry into the labor market (and thus years of pension contributions conditional on age), as
well as different retirement ages even under the same laws (which tend to favor public
employees and women). The second is time variation resulting from the pension rule
changes introduced by the different reforms passed during our estimation period. In addition
to estimating models that exploit each of these two variations, we also compute a more
saturated model including all factors determining the grandparental eligibility status, mean-
ing that identification comes only from time variations in the reform-induced eligibility rules.
This saturatedmodel enables comparison of likewith like; for example, womenwith parents
and in-laws having exactly the same characteristics but whose retirement eligibility status
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varies because of the law in place at the time. It also controls for grandparent characteristics
that, in addition to determining their eligibility status, may also have a direct effect on female
employment or be proxies of grandparents’ career orientation (e.g., age, gender, education,
and employment sector and type).10 It is worth noting that including in the regressions the
determinants of the predicted contribution years we are de facto controlling also for the latter,
which is a linear combination of the former and thus cannot be included in the regression.
We are primarily interested in the role of grandparents as potential providers of
childcare and estimate accordingly Eq. (1) on a sample of women with young children.
Our estimation sample includes every woman aged 20–49 who has at least one child
under 15 living in the household. As a validity check, we also estimate it for the sample
of women in the same age range who have no children under 15 living in the household
and for the sample of their male partners. We focus our attention on the coefficients
βk1;β
k
2;β
k
3, which (multiplied by 100) respectively indicate by how many percentage
points a mother is more or less likely to participate in the labor force if her relative k has
always been out of the labor force, is eligible for state pension and thus potentially
retired from the work force, or is not yet eligible for state pension and thus potentially
still employed (or job hunting) relative to the case in which k is dead. Given the
predominance of women in childcare provision, we expect to find a positive effect of
the availability of maternal and paternal grandmothers for childcare on the women’s
LFP probability but a lower (or no) effect of grandfathers’ availability.
Unlike most previous studies, rather than focusing only on the childcare availability
of maternal grandmothers, we examine that of all grandparents to avoid any omitted
variable bias from its correlating with maternal grandmother availability (e.g., because
of similar characteristics like age or education) and affecting women’s LFP. On the
other hand, considering the aggregate number of available grandparents could hide
heterogeneous effects across grandparents, so for this reason we consider the potential
availability for childcare of each grandparent individually. We also include in the
estimation sample both women whose parents or in-laws were not alive at the time
of interview and those whose parents or in-laws had never participated in the labor
market. These two characteristics enable us to not only compute the effect on women’s
employment of not having living parents and/or in-laws, but also to test for the presence
of heterogeneous effects from parents or in-laws who are available either because they
never worked or because they worked in the past and are now retired. These two groups
may in fact have very different effects on women’s LFP. We expect that the higher the
share of dead grandparents who ever worked, the more βk1 will capture cultural effects
in addition to the childcare availability effect. In particular, an intergenerational corre-
lation is possible between a grandmother’s employment and her daughter’s, reflecting
either unobservable variables correlated across generations or a true causal relation
(e.g., a gender role model).11 Conversely, any negative intergenerational correlation
between a woman’s LFP and her mother’s never having participated in the labor market
10 Omitting these controls may lead to a spurious correlation between grandparental pension eligibility and
female LFP. However, the estimates obtained with the saturated models are robust to the presence of time-
invariant unobservable grandparent characteristics that drive their educational and employment choices and
may also be correlated with female employment. The main assumption is that grandparents who made the
same educational and employment choices have similar unobservable characteristics.
11 See, for instance, Farre and Vella (2013).
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may be partly countervailed by the positive effect produced by the latter’s provision of
informal childcare. The sign of the net effect is therefore an empirical question. Because
it is generally hard to find a convincing exogenous source of variation in parental
(especially, maternal) lifetime LFP, rather than attaching a strictly causal interpretation
to the estimate of βk1, we consider it only suggestive of potential heterogeneous effects
by source of availability. Instead, our main parameter of interest is βk2−β
k
3, the differ-
ence between retirement eligible and ineligible parents or in-laws (who ever worked).
These two groups, although very similar in terms of the unobservable variables driving
labor force attachment, differ only in their pension rule-induced employment status. We
thus interpret this difference causally.
Three other features of our analysis are worth noting. First, unlike those in IV-based
studies, our estimation strategy does not require that the grandparent’s retirement
eligibility has only an indirect effect on women’s LFP via grandparental childcare.
Rather, part of the reduced form (gross) effect estimated of the grandparents’ retirement
eligibility on the women’s LFP may be produced by additional causal pathways and not
exclusively by grandparental childcare. Therefore, to evaluate the relevance of this
latter, we implement several placebo tests; in particular, an estimation of Eq. (1) that
assesses whether the effects are larger for individuals with a greater need for childcare
than for those who need it less (e.g., women vs. men, women with young children vs.
other women). Second, unlike previous researchers, we are able to include control
variables that capture certain alternative pathways through which grandparental pension
eligibility may affect female LFP, in particular, intervivo transfers and inheritances.
Lastly, by focusing on parental and in-law retirement eligibility and not on current
retirement status (an endogenous choice variable), we are able to address a potential
reverse causality bias; namely, that some grandparents may anticipate their retirement
to take care of their grandchildren whose mothers are working (Lumsdaine and
Vermeer 2014).12
Additionally, note that since not all eligible grandparents actually decide to
retire, and not all retired grandparents provide childcare to their children’s
family, our paper provides intention-to-treat (ITT) estimates, which must be
interpreted as lower bound estimates of the effect of grandparent-provided
childcare on maternal employment. In case of effect heterogeneity, IV and ITT
estimates provide effects for the individuals affected by the instrument (com-
pliers), namely retirement eligibility. Given the tendency in Italy of individuals
to retire as soon as they become eligible (e.g., Brugiavini and Peracchi 2012), the
complier population is large enough to be of policy interest.
4 Data
Our analysis is based on data from the SHIW,13 administered by the Bank of Italy
every 2 years 14 to a rotating panel of 8000 households (approximately 24,000
12 More generally, Ho (2015) and Rupert and Zanella (2014), among others, show that grandparents’ labor
supply may be affected by the presence of grandchildren.
13 “Indagine sui bilanci delle famiglie italiane” (Banca d’Italia).
14 Except for a 3-year interval between 1995 and 1998.
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individuals) per year. In addition to focusing on labor market and income-related
issues, the survey also gathers information on such relevant topics as education,
sociodemographics, consumption, and dwelling characteristics. Besides providing
full information on all household members, household heads and their partners
also report the birth year, labor market status, educational attainment, and alive
or dead status of their parents, 15 which we use to analyze grandparental
availability for childcare. Because of data availability and comparability, we
focus on the seven waves covering 1993–2006, for a total potential population of
55,163 households.
Because the relevant survey unit in the SHIW is the household, for every unit in
the sample we use both household-specific (e.g., residential region, household size
and composition) and individual-specific (e.g., demographics, education, labor
market outcomes, income) variables for all household members. We also exploit
the information on the household heads and their partners’ parents. To study the
effects of grandparent availability on maternal labor market outcomes, however, we
must restrict our sample to a subset of relevant households containing a cohabiting
couple who are potential or actual parents. We therefore select all households that
include two partners, one a female aged 20–49 for whom we have complete infor-
mation on both the dependent and independent variables. This selection reduces the
sample to 13,443 couples, 8402 (62.5%) of whom are parents to at least one child
younger than 15 living in the household, while the remaining 5041 couples (37.5%)
either have no offspring or have only children older than 14 or living outside the
household.
Table 2 reports the summary statistics for our sample. The women are on average
younger than their partners by about 3.5 years, slightly more educated, with a
considerably lower LFP rate, about 53% for females versus 98% for males. Inter-
estingly, the female participation rate increases with the age of the children: from
57% for women with no children or children older than 14 in the household to 52%
for women with children younger than 6. The grandmothers in the sample are
consistently about 4 years younger than the grandfathers, and the maternal grand-
parents are 4 years younger than both paternal grandparents. The grandmothers,
however, are less educated than their partners, and less than 30% of them have ever
worked, versus about 93% for grandfathers. The share of grandparents that are not
alive also varies substantially, from a minimum of 15% for maternal grandmothers to
a maximum of 42% for paternal grandfathers. These differences result from the
different birth cohorts: grandfathers are older than grandmothers and men older than
women, so that paternal grandfathers are the least likely and maternal grandmothers
the most likely to be alive.
5 Pension eligibility and retirement
In this paper, we seek to assess the importance of informal childcare provision by
grandparents, proxied by their potential availability, on maternal LFP. As described in
15 For 1998, information on whether grandparents were alive is missing, so for that year, we exploit the panel
dimension of SHIW and recover, where possible, the information from other waves.
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Section 3, we divide the grandparents’ potential availability into four categories: not
alive, never having worked (NW), or in the labor market and either pension eligible
Table 2 Sample summary statistics
Panel A: women and their partners
Women Men
Freq. % Freq. %
In labor force
(children 0–14)
4466 53.15 8224 97.88
In labor force
(children 0–10)*
3450/6479 53.25
In labor force
(children 0–5)*
1989/3803 52.30
In labor force
(no children 0–14)*
2893/5041 57.39
Employed
(children 0–14)
4253 50.62 7912 94.17
Employed
(children 0–10)*
3272/6479 50.50
Employed
(children 0–5)*
1878/3803 49.38
Employed
(no children 0–14)*
2772/5041 54.99
Lower secondary or less 4028 47.94 4285 51.00
Upper secondary 3463 41.22 3199 38.07
Tertiary or above 911 10.84 918 10.93
Obs. Mean (SD) Obs. Mean (SD)
Age 8402 37.0 (5.97) 8402 40.55 (6.60)
Income 8402 6932 (9111) 8402 21,204 (21,457)
Panel B: grandparents
Mothers Mothers-in-law Fathers Fathers-in-law
Freq. % Freq. % Freq. % Freq. %
Not alive 1247 14.84 1797 21.39 2806 33.40 3532 42.04
Alive and never
worked
4775 56.83 4626 55.06 126 1.50 106 1.26
Alive and eligible 1715 20.41 1603 19.08 3686 43.87 3699 44.03
Alive and ineligible 665 7.91 376 4.48 1784 21.21 1065 12.68
Lower secondary
or less
7685 91.47 7795 92.78 7335 87.30 7482 89.05
Upper secondary 576 6.86 491 5.84 752 8.95 620 7.38
Tertiary or above 141 1.68 116 1.38 315 3.75 300 3.57
Private sector 1980 23.57 1868 22.23 6526 77.67 6580 78.31
Public sector 534 6.36 417 4.96 1280 15.23 1310 15.59
Never worked 5888 70.08 6117 72.80 596 7.09 512 6.09
Self-employed 822 9.78 807 9.60 2129 25.34 2323 27.65
Obs. Mean (SD) Obs. Mean (SD) Obs. Mean (SD) Obs. Mean (SD)
Age 8402 65.7 (9.12) 8402 69.0 (9.47) 8402 69.6 (9.56) 8402 73.1 (10.07)
Except for the variables marked with an asterisk, whose sample size is reported next to the frequency, statistics
are reported for the baseline sample of 8402 women aged 20–49 who have at least one child under 15 living in
the household
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(EL) or pension ineligible (NEL). Because the SHIWasks respondents directly about
their parents’ labor market participation, age, birth year, and employment sector and
type, we have all the information needed to determine pension eligibility, except for
years of contribution. To derive this variable, we exploit the fact that the SHIW does
record years of pension contributions for all individuals interviewed. First, we
regress the actual contribution years on a set of individual characteristics (gender,
age, education, employment sector and type, year, and region) available for both the
grandparent cohort 16 and the surveyed individual cohort and then predict the
grandparents’ years of contribution on the basis of the estimated coefficients. The
regression results are reported in Appendix 1. Once these predictions are obtained,
we have all the necessary information to determine whether every grandparent
satisfies at least one of the pension requirements and is thus eligible or ineligible
for a pension. All regressions using retirement eligibility based on predicted contri-
bution years are bootstrapped (1000 replications) to account for the generated
regressors.
We test pension eligibility as a valid predictor of retirement status by running
simple regressions of actual individual retirement status of all surveyed individuals
(albeit separately for men and women) on both a constant and imputed pension
eligibility indicator. The coefficients estimated on this eligibility indicator are
0.719 (SE = 0.006) for men and 0.857 (SE = 0.005) for women, 17 which, when
considered together with our main results (reported below), support the validity of
pension eligibility as a predictor of potential childcare availability based on actual
retirement.
As already emphasized, rather than relying solely on individual age to define
pension eligibility (as in AFVF 2015), we exploit both age-based retirement pension
rules and seniority pension rules by combining age with sector of employment, type
of activity, and predicted years of contribution. This is a major improvement in
identification strategy not only because many of the formerly employed individuals
in the grandparent cohort began working at a very young age but because a relevant
share of grandparents not meeting the retirement age condition are likely to satisfy
the seniority pension criterion of contribution years. In fact, Table 3 does indeed
reveal a notable percentage of grandparents eligible based on the contribution
requirement while still not meeting the age criterion: 30.5% of fathers, 28.6% of
mothers, 33.5% of fathers-in-law, and 33.2% of mothers-in-law. Thus, neglecting the
seniority pension criterion would lead to a substantial underestimation of grandpa-
rental eligibility, potentially reducing the estimated impact of pension eligibility on
female LFP.
16 Parents’ (in-laws’) sectors and types of employment are measured when they had the same age as the
respondent (spouse). In case they were unemployed at that time, the characteristics of the last job are
reported.
17 Potential eligibility is a better predictor of actual retirement for women than for men, which suggests
that (because of special rules for hazardous jobs, as stressed in footnote 9) men anticipate or postpone
retirement with respect to pension eligibility, while women are more tied to it. Men could decide to
postpone retirement with respect to the minimum eligible age more frequently than women for several
reasons, including higher income, a good enough health status to work, social norms, and/or a higher
psychological costs of retirement.
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6 Effect of grandparental availability on maternal labor force participation
6.1 Main results
Table 4 reports the results of estimating Eq. (1) for a sample of women aged 20–49 who
are either household heads or partners and mothers to at least one child under 15 living
in the household. In all cases, the columns reporting the different specifications display
the estimated coefficients on the three dummy variables NW, EL, and NEL for the
woman’s mother (maternal grandmother), mother-in-law (paternal grandmother),
father (maternal grandfather), and father-in-law (paternal grandfather). Column (1)
lists the outcomes for the basic specification, which includes only these 12 variables
of interest together with region-by-year fixed effects and dummies for municipality
size (< 20,000, 20,000–40,000, 40,000–500,000, > 500,000 inhabitants). Column
(2) reports the results for an enriched specification that controls for grandparental
educational level (up to lower secondary, upper secondary or tertiary, and above),
which may proxy for downstream monetary transfers to women, a major channel
through which working grandparents may affect women’s LFP. It also controls for
grandparents’ age, which in addition to affecting their pension eligibility may also
affect their health status and thus a daughter(-in-law)’s LFP. Column (3) adds in a
quadratic form for the woman’s age and dummies for her educational level, which
may significantly affect her LFP probability. Column (4) then integrates controls for
Table 3 Eligibility by different criteria
Eligibility according to age criterion only
Ineligible Eligible
Eligibility Father Ineligible 984 670
(%) 17.99 12.25
Eligible 1668 2148
(%) 30.49 39.27
Mother Ineligible 491 174
(%) 20.63 7.31
Eligible 681 1034
(%) 28.61 43.45
Father-in-law Ineligible 548 433
(%) 11.50 9.09
Eligible 1595 2188
(%) 33.48 45.93
Mother-in-law Ineligible 237 139
(%) 11.98 7.02
Eligible 657 946
(%) 33.20 47.80
The table shows eligibility according to age and contribution criteria and eligibility according to age criterion
only. Sample size is lower than 8402 since eligibility can only be computed for individuals who are alive and
ever participated in the labor force
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partner’s education and income, both of which may affect female LFP. Our key result
is consistent throughout all specifications: having a mother who is eligible for a state
pension has a positive and strongly statistically significant effect on the probability
of labor force participation for a 20- to 49-year-old woman who is mother to a
resident child under 15. The magnitude of the effects implied by the estimates in
column (4) is sizable: having a pension-eligible mother implies that her daughter is
10.7 percentage points more likely to participate in the labor force than women
whose mother has died, and 8.1 percentage points more likely than those whose
mother is currently pension ineligible.18
The models used in columns (1)–(4) of Table 4 identify the effect of grandparental
retirement eligibility by simultaneously exploiting within-year and between-year vari-
ation across individuals. Because grandparental eligibility is imputed based on observ-
able characteristics, some of which are excluded from the LFP equation (i.e., employ-
ment sector and type), one possible criticism is that these characteristics may also have
a direct effect on maternal employment. Hence, in column (5), we add in dummies for
public sector employment and self-employment, allowing us to compare the effect on
maternal employment of having grandparents with exactly the same observable char-
acteristics but different pension eligibility. Because grandparental pension eligibility as
defined in Section 5 is a nonlinear function of these characteristics, even in this
saturated model, we still exploit some cross-sectional variation across individuals in
grandparental availability. Nevertheless, most identification is achieved through varia-
tion in pension eligibility rules over time resulting from the pension reforms described
in Section 3. This claim is verified by Fig. 2, which reports the R-squared of year-
specific regressions of each grandparent’s pension eligibility status on its determinants.
The R-squared is very high in all years, and it increases over time as pension eligibility
becomes increasingly linked to years of contribution, from about 0.75 in 1993 to 0.95
in the 2000s. Thus, after 2000, almost all variation in eligibility status comes from
pension reforms.
Even in the saturated model in column (5), the difference between the coefficients
on “mother alive and ineligible” and “mother alive and eligible” amounts to 7.1
percentage points (statistically significant at the 5% level), an 11% increase in
probability relative to women with ineligible mothers. Moreover, our column (5)
estimates show no statistically significant effect of either maternal grandfathers or
paternal grandparents on maternal LFP. It is also interesting to note that the coeffi-
cients of mother-in-law eligible and mother-in-law ineligible in column (4) are very
similar, suggesting a LFP premium that is likely to be related to the mother-in-law’s
LFP status rather than to her pension eligibility status, an observation confirmed by
the drop in both coefficients in column (5) when grandparental employment char-
acteristics are included. In fact, this latter completely absorbs the effect of paternal
grandmothers’ current or past employment status.19 It is worth noting that because
18 The latter effect is measured based on β2 − β3, which is reported at the bottom of each column. A test for the
hypothesis that β2 = β3 rejects the null with a p value of 0.016.
19 Even in the presence of unobserved characteristics that are correlated with grandparental employment sector
or type, we still consider the contrast βk2−β
k
3 to be a valid estimate of the effect of having pension-eligible
grandparents, because these characteristics are similar across both eligible and ineligible grandparents working
in the same employment sector and type. Moreover, later in this section, we also report regression results using
definitions of retirement eligibility that are not based on grandparental labor market characteristics.
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there might be concerns that some of the grandparents’ characteristics (namely
grandparents’ sector and type of job) may be endogenous with respect to mothers’
LFP, the fact that the results are largely insensitive to the exclusion (column 4) of
such control variables is quite reassuring.
We report in Appendix 2 the results of a number of additional regressions that we
have estimated to check the robustness and sensitivity of our main findings. Specifi-
cally, we have replaced the dependent variable with, alternatively, employment status,
weekly working hours, hourly wages, annual earnings; used alternative definitions of
pension eligibility; and accounted for self-selection into motherhood with a Heckman
sample selection model. All these additional checks strengthen the results of our
analysis.20
6.2 Insights on the causal pathway
Until now, we have shown that women whose mothers are retirement eligible are
significantly more likely to participate in the labor market, an effect that does not
20 In SHIW, each of the spouses provides information about his/her parents. Thus, information about paternal
grandparents is not available for single women (i.e., single, separated, divorced, widowed). For this reason,
and given that they represent less than 5% of our sample of women with young children, we prefer to report in
the text the estimates on the sample of coupled women. However, we also estimated a modified model in
which single mothers are included and all the characteristics of paternal grandparents are excluded from the
model, and a model in which single mothers are included and all characteristics of paternal grandparents for
single mothers’ households are set to zero and interacted with a dummy variable identifying single mothers’
households. The difference in LFP between coupled women with and without eligible maternal grandmothers
are 6.8 p.p. and 7.3 p.p. in the first and second model, respectively, while in the latter, the same difference
cannot be meaningfully estimated for single mothers due to small cell sizes.
Fig. 2 R-squared of year-specific regressions of each grandparent’s eligibility status on its determinants. Note.
The figure reports the R-squared of year-specific regressions of dichotomous indicators for each grandparent’s
pension eligibility status (eligible or not) on their age, and dummies for educational attainment, public sector
employment, self-employment, and region of residence
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hold true for the eligibility of their mothers-in-law. We therefore wonder whether
grandparental (potential) availability for childcare is a plausible explanation for this
finding. If so, we would expect to find evidence that maternal grandparents
(grandmothers) are more likely to provide childcare than paternal grandparents
(grandmothers). Extant research supports this view: a greater investment in
childcare by maternal grandmothers is a very robust pattern in the sociological,
psychological, and evolutionary literature (Coall et al. 2014), one recorded for
several countries, including the UK, the USA, Australia, Italy, and Norway (see
Whelan 2013; Arpino et al. 2014).
We further check the plausibility of the childcare explanation in several interre-
lated ways. First, we reestimate Eq. (1) for a sample of female household heads or
their partners, again in the 20–49 age range, who are not mothers to any cohabiting
children under the age of 15. For these women, the potential availability of maternal
or paternal grandparents for childcare should have no effect on LFP. We report the
results for this alternative sample in column (2) of Table 5 with a focus on the most
complete specification (equivalent to that in column (5) of Table 4, whose results
we repeat for convenience in column (1) of Table 5). These outcomes offer further
support for our interpretation of the effects: for women who have no cohabiting
children under 15, there is no indication of a positive effect of the availability of
maternal or paternal grandparents on LFP.
We then perform an even more informative validation test for our proposed expla-
nation by estimating Eq. (1) on the subsample of male partners in the estimation
sample. Because men are typically less involved in childcare activities21 (especially
in a Southern European country like Italy), we expect no positive effect of grandpa-
rental availability on their LFP unless this availability affects labor market behavior
through a channel other than childcare. These results, reported in column (3) of Table 5,
indicate that maternal grandparental pension eligibility has no effect on these men’s
LFP.
A further test for the plausibility of the childcare channel as the main driver of our
results relies on the fact that the childcare burden may be especially high during the
child’s earliest years, so it is then that family childcare support may be most
important in determining maternal LFP. If the availability of childcare by a grand-
mother is driving our results, then the younger her daughter’s children, the stronger
the effect of the grandmother’s pension eligibility should become. Hence, in the last
two columns of Table 5, we restrict our sample to women who have children under
the age of 11 (column (4)) and under the age of 6 (column (5)). As expected, the
estimated effect of a grandmother’s pension eligibility increases from a baseline of
0.085 for women with children up to 14 to 0.104 and 0.203 for women whose
children are under 11 and under 6 (compulsory school entry age), respectively. These
estimates imply that women whose children are under 11 and whose mothers are
pension eligible are 11% (6.5 percentage points) more likely to participate in the
labor force than women whose children are in the same age range but whose mother
is not yet pension eligible. The same difference increases to 25% (14.8 percentage
points) for women whose children are under 6, a substantially larger effect than the
21 See, for example, OECD (2001) and Bloemen et al. (2010).
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reduced form effect reported in AFVF (2015) in the sample of women with young
children.
A distinctive feature of SHIW data, compared to the FSSS data used in a previous
work for Italy (see Section 2), is that it provides information on monetary and house
transfers received by a woman or her partner from parents and in-laws on monetary
transfers from relatives and friends and on home ownership. This provision allows
us to sterilize some potential confounders of the effect of grandparent-provided
childcare by including additional regressors aimed at capturing potentially concom-
itant effects of grandparental retirement eligibility in Eq. (1) (e.g., those mediated by
wealth effects). Table 6 thus includes monetary transfers and alternative dummy
variables for the following: (i) being owner of the dwelling (vs. rent or free use),
which controls for a wealth effect; ii) having received the dwelling as a gift, which
controls for any additional effect of severance payments received upon retirement in
terms of wealth transfer from grandparents; and (iii) having received the dwelling as
an inheritance or gift or being able to use it for free, which controls for any additional
financial resources that a household may devote to formal or external childcare.
Although these control variables may be potential mediating factors (“bad controls,”
i.e., potentially affected by grandparent retirement eligibility), this is exactly the
reason for their inclusion: to purge out the coefficient on retirement eligibility from
the potential mediating factor represented by money and wealth transfers. The three
variables are highly correlated, and as shown in columns (1)–(3), the corresponding
models exhibit virtually no differences from the baseline model (reported in column
(1)). This finding is reassuring evidence of no correlation between retirement
eligibility and wealth or monetary transfers, at least as far as these can be measured
using the SHIW variables as proxies.
6.3 Heterogeneous effects
We investigate potential heterogeneity in the grandparental eligibility effect based
on two factors: women’s educational levels and the potential supply of external
childcare. Because less educated women generally command lower wages in the
labor market, their LFP and employment decisions are more sensitive to the avail-
ability of low-cost, flexible grandparent-provided childcare than those of highly
educated women, who may have access to external childcare (Hofferth andWissoker
1992; Powell 2002). To check this prediction, in column (2) of Table 7, we estimate a
saturated model (reported for convenience in column (1)) that additionally includes
the interactions between maternal grandmother’s eligibility and the educational
attainment of the women in our sample of mothers with cohabiting children. We
define as highly educated those women who have completed upper secondary
education or more, and as less educated, those who have completed lower
secondary education or less.22 Less educated women with pension-eligible mothers
are 9.7 percentage points more likely to participate in the labor force than their
counterparts with ineligible mothers, a difference that is significant at the 10% level.
22 Our definitions are motivated by the fact that in Italy (unlike in the USA), tertiary educational achievement
is very low. Nevertheless, the results remain robust to defining only women with a university degree as highly
educated.
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In contrast, the effect for highly educated women, albeit positive, is about 5 percent-
age points smaller and statistically insignificant.
Because external childcare could be a substitute for grandparent-provided childcare, we
expect the effect of grandparental eligibility to be larger whenwomen have access to fewer
childcare alternatives. Since public and private formal childcare is likely to be more
abundant in larger municipalities, in column (3) of Table 7, we report the estimates from
a model that interacts grandparental eligibility with the size of the municipality of
residence. The results are consistent with theoretical expectations. In smaller municipal-
ities (20,000 inhabitants or less), the eligible-ineligible grandmother difference amounts to
11.2 percentage points, while in larger municipalities (over 20,000 inhabitants), the
difference is much smaller (2.5 percentage points) and statistically insignificant.23 Since
geographical mobility of younger individuals is more frequent from smaller to larger
municipalities, another possible explanation of this finding is that in the former women are
more likely not to have migrated and reside close to their parents or parents-in-law, who
could then provide childcare more easily.
7 Discussion
Our finding that women whose mothers are unavailable for childcare suffer a
nonnegligible LFP penalty relative to those who can potentially count on such informal
assistance throws light on the unintended consequences of pension reforms on maternal
labor force participation. In particular, such reforms are likely to penalize women whose
mothers become unavailable because of a higher retirement age or stricter retirement
requirements. On the other hand, it may also be useful to assess the aggregate effect of
pension reforms on the average LFP of all women with children aged 0–14, an effect
specific to this demographic group and not to female LFP overall. Overall female LFP
may in fact increase if a higher retirement age translates into longer retention of women
in the work force. What is likely to change is the distribution of LFP across different
generations of women and between women with and without children.
To throw light on this issue, we carry out back-of-the-envelope computations of the
average LFP in our sample under different retirement rule scenarios while keeping the
sample characteristics fixed. More specifically, we use two scenarios: a pre-Amato
scenario and a Dini scenario, in which either the rules predating the Amato reform or
the Dini rules (see Table 1) are assumed to be in place for the whole period. After first
redefining maternal grandmother eligibility based on these different rule sets, we
recompute the average predicted LFP probabilities from our preferred specification
for the estimation sample.24 The results of this exercise are graphed in Fig. 3. Subfigure
23 This result, however, is only suggestive and should be interpreted with caution. First, detailed data on
childcare availability are only available for recent years; for example, ISTAT only provides regional indicators
on public childcare since 2004. Second, the supply of public childcare is likely to be endogenous and mainly
demand driven. Hence, using data from 2004, we regress on a regional level the logarithm of the percentage of
municipalities that implemented childcare services on the logarithm of the percentage of municipalities with
over 20,000 inhabitants (controlling for macroarea indicators) and obtain an elasticity of 0.49 (t = 1.98). In the
absence of better data, we take this result as suggestive of childcare services being more abundant in larger
municipalities.
24 At the aggregate level, these average predicted probabilities can be interpreted as average labor force
participation rates.
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(a) shows only a small impact of the retirement rules on average LFP, with year
differences ranging between 0.80 (1993) and 0.97 (1998) percentage points (see
Appendix 3). These differences correspond to about a 1.7% decline in the labor force
participation of mothers. Nevertheless, it must be kept in mind that the main drivers of
the average LFP differences between the two scenarios are the differences in share of
pension-eligible grandmothers produced by the retirement rules. These latter depend in
turn on the demographic characteristics of our estimation sample. For example, high
maternal age at first birth is likely to reduce the reform’s impact on female LFP in that most
womenwill then havemothers who are old enough to be retirement eligible nomatter what
rules we consider in our simulations. Subfigure (b) then reports the aggregate effect
(computed in the same way) on mothers of preschool children (0–5), for whom, consistent
with the results in Table 4, column (5), the interscenario differences increase. We now
observe differences between 2.3 (2000) and 2.9 (1998) percentage points, corresponding to
a − 4 and − 5.5% decrease in maternal LFP. Another potential determinant of the pension
reforms’ low impact in the sample of all mothers (i.e., with children 0–14) may be that a
substantial proportion of maternal grandmothers have never participated in the labor
market and so are unaffected by the retirement rule changes. Thus, in subfigure (c), which
Fig. 3 Simulated labor force participation rates in the sample of women with children aged 0–14 (a) and 0–5
(b), and whose mother participated in the labor force (c). Note. The figure reports the labor force participation
rates of different samples of women computed under different sets of rules on pension eligibility for their
mothers. Specifically, the darker line with circles is drawn under the assumption that in all years the eligibility
rules are those that were in place until 1992 (i.e., before the Amato reform), whereas the lighter line with
squares is drawn under the assumption that in all years the more restrictive rules set by the 1995 Dini reform
apply to everyone. The samples consist of all women with children aged 0–14 in subfigure a, all women with
children aged 0–5 in subfigure b, and all women with children aged 0–14, whose mothers participated in the
labor force in subfigure c
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reports the same two scenarios but with average LFP predicted only for women whose
mothers have worked, we observe a much larger gap: the Dini reform has a negative effect
on the daughters’LFP, which peaks in 2000 and amounts to a 4.2% reduction relative to the
actual baseline LFP of 67.7%.
8 Concluding remarks
In Southern European countries such as Italy, which are characterized by very low provision
of public childcare, grandparents offer women an important source of informal childcare,
which helps them reconcile family and working life. In this paper, therefore, we seek to
quantify the effect of such grandparental availability on maternal LFP. We focus on Italy for
two reasons: First, its female employment rates are among the lowest in Europe, making it
important to identify which factors are hindering the entry of more women into the
workforce. Second, the changes in pension eligibility requirements introduced by Italy’s
three recent major pension reforms provide exogenous variation in grandparental availability.
Exploiting this exogenous variation, we estimate thatmothers of children under 15whose
own mothers are retirement eligible have a 7.1 percentage points higher probability of
participating in the labor force (+ 11%) than thosewhosemothers are ineligible.We interpret
this intention-to-treat effect to mean that the potential availability of maternal grandmothers
for childcare increases their daughters’ LFP, a conclusion supported by several robustness
checks. In fact, we find no such effects for either women with no children under 15 or men,
and as could be expected, the magnitude of the effects is larger for women with very young
children whose childcare needs are most intensive. These findings remain robust even to
controlling for parental downstream transfers, considering female employment instead of
LFP and addressing potential selection issues into motherhood. We also show that when
fully enforced, the pension reforms imply a 1–1.5% yearly reduction on the LFP rates of
womenwith children aged 0–14 and a 5.5%yearly reduction for thosewith children aged 0–
5. Taken together, these results indicate that pension reforms that raise the retirement age or
tighten the requirements for seniority pensions, if not coupled with adequate investments in
public childcare, may have unintended negative consequences for the employment proba-
bilities of females of childbearing age by robbing households of an important source of
flexible, low-cost childcare.
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Appendix 1
Appendix 2. Robustness checks and further evidence
We report in this appendix a number of additional analyses that we have performed to
check the robustness and sensitivity of our results. Specifically, we have replaced the
dependent variable with, alternatively, employment status, weekly working hours,
hourly wages, annual earnings; used alternative definitions of pension eligibility; and
Table 8 Regression for predicted years of contribution
Dep. var.: actual years of contribution (1)
Male 5.210***
(0.062)
Age 0.627***
(0.003)
Education: none Ref
.
Education: primary 5.959***
(0.149)
Education: lower secondary 8.373***
(0.157)
Education: upper secondary and vocational 7.709***
(0.160)
Education: tertiary 5.535***
(0.181)
Education: post-tertiary 4.061***
(0.684)
Sector: agriculture Ref
.
Sector: industry − 0.817***
0.193
Sector: public 0.695***
(0.199)
Sector: others − 1.627***
(0.193)
Sector: not in the labor force − 4.590***
(0.192)
Regions Yes
Years Yes
Adjusted R-squared 0.570
Observations 74,866
Standard errors in parenthesis
OLS. The sample includes all individuals in the SHIW sample
*p value < 0.1; **p value < 0.05; ***p value < 0.01
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accounted for self-selection into motherhood with a Heckman sample selection model.
All these additional checks strengthen the results of our analysis.
Employment. In Table 9, we report the same models estimated in Table 4 but using as
our dependent variable a dichotomous indicator equal to 1 if a woman is employed and 0
otherwise. Results are very close to those using LFP: in the saturated model (column (5) of
Table 9), among the eight grandparent eligibility variables, only the coefficient on maternal
grandmother eligibility is statistically significant at the 5% level. Women with pension-
eligible mothers have an 8.5 and 7.7 percentage point higher employment probability,
respectively, than womenwhosemothers are dead or pension ineligible. The corresponding
effects on LFP are 8.5 percentage points and 7.1 percentage points, respectively (column
(5) of Table 4). The fact that the LFP and employment results are practically indistinguish-
able strongly suggests that the pension eligibility status of maternal grandmothers does
indeed capture the effect of their childcare provision. In fact, we expect no significant effect
on unemployed mothers, who can personally take care of their children.
Intensive margins. The availability of informal childcare may affect not only LFP (or
employment) probability but also the intensive margin of labor supply; that is, the number
of hours worked, or even women’s productivity, reflected in wages and earnings. Grand-
parents may, for instance, take care of children when they are ill, reducing the number of
maternal absences from work in the short run and possibly even improving the latter’s
career prospects in the long run. To gain an approximate idea of the grandparent availability
effect on weekly working hours, hourly wages, and annual earnings, we use the saturated
model to estimate logarithmic regressions on the sample of working mothers. The estimat-
ed effects of maternal grandmother availability are 0.022, 0.045, and 0.075 on hours,
wages, and earnings, respectively, none of which are statistically significant at conventional
levels (results are available upon request). Thus, overall, there is no compelling evidence
that grandmother availability for childcare affects the intensive margin of labor supply or
productivity. Grandmothers simply seem to help working women to overcome their first
important obstacle after having children—remaining attached to the labor force.
Alternative definitions of pension eligibility. We have stated earlier in this paper that
considering seniority-based pension rules in addition to age-based pension rules increases
the precision of our measure of grandparental eligibility and potential availability for
childcare. To support this claim, here we redefine eligibility based purely on age and then
reestimate the saturated model. The results, reported in column (2) of Table 10, are
qualitatively similar to (albeit less precisely estimated than) our baseline findings (column
(1)): a 0.043 difference in LFP between women with and without eligible mothers, which is
in line with that reported in the reduced form estimates of AFVF (2015). This difference is,
however, not statistically significant at conventional levels, presumably because of the
noisier imputation of eligibility status, which does not consider the requirements for
seniority pensions.
Finally, in column (2) of Table 11, we follow Aparicio-Fenoll and Vidal-
Fernandez (2015) by imputing eligibility only on age and omitting controls for
grandparental education and employment sector and type. Although the coeffi-
cient on grandparental eligibility increases and is significant at 5%, the contrast
between pension-eligible and nonpension-eligible maternal grandmothers further
reduces in size (0.037) and loses statistical significance. This outcome again
underscores the importance of exploiting seniority pension rules in defining
retirement eligibility.
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Sample selection issues. The final concern that we address is related to our initial
sample selection. Because we focus on the effect of grandparental childcare availability on
maternal labor force participation, our analysis is conditional on women having children
aged 0–14 living in the household. Yet this condition begs the question of whether this
population of interest actually constitutes a random sample of women with respect to
unobservable characteristics that potentially affect labor market behavior. For example, if
we were also to include childless women entering motherhood, would the effect of
grandparental eligibility be larger or smaller than that reported? To provide a tentative
answer, we estimate a Heckman selection model using the main equation for LFP and a
selection equation for the presence of children aged 0–14 in the household. Although the
model is formally identified even without an exclusion restriction (Puhani 2000), we
propose an economic identification that uses as “instrument” a proxy for the woman’s
spouse being an only child; that is, the number (from the SHIW) of noncohabiting siblings
still alive for each individual in a couple. This number is likely to be a good proxy for only-
child status because mortality is still low in the age groups considered and sibling
cohabitation after forming families and having children is very rare.
The underlying rationale for using this instrument is that being raised as an only
child may affect each spouse’s fertility preferences, which are likely to shape the
couple’s actual fertility. We assume that conditional on the large set of observables
included in our models (such as women’s, grandparents’, and partners’ characteristics,
including the latter’s level of education and income), the spouse’s only-child status is
exogenous with respect to the woman’s labor market attachment. We consider only the
spousal status because previous studies show that maternal grandparents are the most
likely to provide childcare, so the women’s only-child status may violate the exclusion
restriction assumption if siblings create higher competition for the maternal grand-
mother’s childcare. We also expect this focus to break any potential link between a
woman’s fertility, her mother’s fertility, and the woman’s labor market preferences,
which may be correlated across generations because of unobservable attributes.25
Table 11 reports the results of the Heckman selection model. Column (1) shows the
coefficients of the selection equation, and column (2) those of the main equation. The
spouse’s only-child status significantly predicts the presence of young children in the
household: only-child men are 4.7 (p value = 0.028) percentage points less likely to have
cohabiting young children. Interestingly, women with eligible mothers have a 3.5. percent-
age points higher probability of having young cohabiting children than thosewith ineligible
mothers, a finding consistent with the effect reported by Battistin et al. (2015) on fertility,
although in our case, the estimate is not statistically significant. This outcomemay be due to
the different dependent variables used in the two studies. For our study, the relevant
selection is on the presence of young children in the household (see also Battistin et al.
2015, for a comprehensive analysis of the effect of grandparental pension eligibility on
fertility). All effects for the selection equation are computed as average marginal effects.
The coefficient on the inverse Mill’s ratio is positive, but conditioning on a large set of
25 The estimates in this section must be nonetheless interpreted with caution because some residual
endogeneity may remain if the spouse’s only-child status is affected by unobservable variables that also
determine her partner’s LFP. To the best of our knowledge, the existing literature focuses mainly on mother-
son or mother-daughter intergenerational fertility correlations (e.g., Kolk 2014; Cools and Kaldager Hart
2016), while much less is known about the relation between a woman’s fertility choices and her partner’s
family size.
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controls is not statistically significant at conventional levels. Column (2) also shows that
eligible grandmothers increase LFP by an estimated 7.9 percentage points with respect to
noneligible grandmothers. This effect is practically the same as that estimated in the model
that does not account for selection. Although we do not consider this evidence as definitive
proof of the absence of a sample selection bias, which would allow us to generalize our
estimated effects to childless women if they were mothers, it is nonetheless indicative that
the bias, if any, is unlikely to be severe.
Table 9 Effect of grandparental availability on the employment of women with children under 15
Dep. var.: woman
employment
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Mothers
Alive and never worked 0.038 (0.025) 0.04 (0.026) 0.022 (0.026) 0.019 (0.025) 0.026 (0.025)
Alive and eligible 0.151*** (0.029) 0.131*** (0.029) 0.109*** (0.029) 0.103*** (0.029) 0.085* (0.044)
Alive and ineligible 0.053 (0.038) 0.047 (0.041) 0.022 (0.040) 0.015 (0.039) 0.007 (0.049)
Mothers-in-law
Alive and never worked 0.036 (0.023) 0.037 (0.024) 0.025 (0.025) 0.022 (0.025) 0.041 (0.028)
Alive and eligible 0.096*** (0.028) 0.086*** (0.029) 0.065** (0.029) 0.065** (0.029) − 0.003 (0.040)
Alive and ineligible 0.080* (0.047) 0.083* (0.048) 0.073 (0.048) 0.067 (0.047) 0.016 (0.052)
Fathers
Alive and never worked 0.035 (0.062) 0.045 (0.062) 0.053 (0.062) 0.052 (0.062) 0.074 (0.071)
Alive and eligible 0.015 (0.021) 0.017 (0.021) − 0.002 (0.021) − 0.002 (0.021) − 0.004 (0.021)
Alive and ineligible − 0.038 (0.026) 0.003 (0.030) − 0.003 (0.029) − 0.004 (0.028) 0.005 (0.029)
Fathers-in-law
Alive and never worked − 0.132* (0.072) − 0.103 (0.070) − 0.097 (0.071) − 0.098 (0.070) − 0.07 (0.077)
Alive and eligible 0.023 (0.020) 0.027 (0.020) 0.002 (0.019) − 0.003 (0.019) − 0.004 (0.019)
Alive and ineligible − 0.029 (0.028) − 0.001 (0.032) − 0.02 (0.030) − 0.024 (0.030) − 0.01 (0.030)
Grandparent’s age (linear and
squared) and education
No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Woman’s age (linear and
squared) and education
No No Yes Yes Yes
Partner’s education and
income
No No No Yes Yes
Grandparent’s employment
sector and type
No No No No Yes
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8402 8402 8402 8402 8402
Mother alive eligible–mother
alive ineligible
0.098*** 0.084** 0.087*** 0.088*** 0.077**
Employment rate of women if
mother alive ineligible
59.25% 59.25% 59.25% 59.25% 59.25%
Linear probability model. The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15
living in the household. Standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped and clustered by household, obser-
vations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is being dead
*p value < 0.1; **p value < 0.05; ***p value < 0.01
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Table 10 Effect of grandparental availability on the labor force participation of women with children under
15 under different imputations of retirement eligibility
Basis for eligibility
Our definition Age only Age only
Dep. var.: woman in the labor force (1) (2) (3)
Mothers
Alive and never worked 0.033 (0.025) 0.035 (0.025) 0.025 (0.025)
Alive and eligible 0.085* (0.044) 0.065 (0.043) 0.094*** (0.029)
Alive and ineligible 0.014 (0.051) 0.022 (0.057) 0.057 (0.046)
Mothers-in-law
Alive and never worked 0.041 (0.028) 0.041 (0.028) 0.020 (0.026)
Alive and eligible − 0.017 (0.039) − 0.023 (0.038) 0.062** (0.029)
Alive and ineligible 0.001 (0.053) 0.094 (0.068) 0.186*** (0.065)
Fathers
Alive and never worked 0.08 (0.070) 0.088 (0.070) 0.069 (0.062)
Alive and eligible − 0.004 (0.020) − 0.005 (0.020) − 0.004 (0.020)
Alive and ineligible − 0.015 (0.028) − 0.037 (0.035) − 0.031 (0.036)
Fathers-in-law
Alive and never worked − 0.111 (0.076) − 0.103 (0.075) − 0.131* (0.068)
Alive and eligible − 0.011 (0.019) − 0.010 (0.018) − 0.009 (0.018)
Alive and ineligible − 0.026 (0.030) − 0.053 (0.052) − 0.062 (0.054)
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Only age
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes Yes
Partner’s education and income Yes Yes Yes
Grandparent’s employment sector and type Yes Yes No
Municipality size Yes Yes Yes
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8402 8402 8402
Mother alive eligible–mother alive ineligible 0.071** 0.043 0.037
Labor force participation rate of women if mother alive ineligible 62.26% 58.76% 58.76%
Linear probability model. The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15
living in the household. Standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped only in column (1) and clustered by
household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is being dead
*p value < 0.1; **p value < 0.05; ***p value < 0.01
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Table 11 Effect of grandparental availability on the labor force participation of women with children under
15—Heckman selection model
Dep. var. Child 0–14 (selection) LFP
(1) (2)
Mothers
Alive and never worked 0.049 (0.075) 0.034 (0.029)
Alive and eligible 0.150 (0.130) 0.094** (0.05)
Alive and ineligible 0.031 (0.126) 0.015 (0.053)
Mothers-in-law
Alive and never worked 0.027 (0.067) 0.045 (0.030)
Alive and eligible 0.000 (0.103) − 0.017 (0.043)
Alive and ineligible 0.043 (0.135) 0.006 (0.054)
Fathers
Alive and never worked 0.085 (0.288) 0.094 (0.071)
Alive and eligible 0.020 (0.052) − 0.005 (0.030)
Alive and ineligible − 0.026 (0.097) − 0.012 (0.029)
Fathers-in-law
Alive and never worked 0.146 (0.269) − 0.132* (0.072)
Alive and eligible 0.094 (0.054) − 0.007 (0.027)
Alive and ineligible − 0.041 (0.100) − 0.031 (0.031)
No. of spouse’s noncohabiting siblings alive 0.157** (0.078) –
Inverse Mill’s ratio – 0.123 (0.338)
Grandparent’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes
Woman’s age (linear and squared) and education Yes Yes
Partner’s education and income Yes Yes
Grandparent’s employment sector and type Yes Yes
Municipality size Yes Yes
Region × year fixed effects Yes Yes
Observations 13,441 8402
Mother alive eligible–mother alive ineligible 0.035 0.079**
Labor force participation rate of women if mother alive ineligible 62.49% 59.25%
Linear probability model. The sample includes women aged 20–49, who have at least one child under 15
living in the household. Standard errors in parenthesis are bootstrapped only in column (1) and clustered by
household, observations are weighted, and the omitted category for availability status is being dead. Column
(1) reports the coefficients of the probit selection equation
*p value < 0.1; **p value < 0.05; ***p value < 0.01
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Appendix 3. Predicted labor force participation rates
Table 12 Predicted labor force participation rates under different scenarios
Full sample (a) With children aged 0–5 (b) With grandmothers who have ever been in
labor force (c)
Year Pre-Amato Dini Difference Pre-Amato Dini Difference Pre-Amato Dini Difference
1993 0.5024 0.4944 0.0080 0.4880 0.4627 0.0253 0.6102 0.5854 0.0248
1995 0.5249 0.5164 0.0085 0.5291 0.5020 0.0271 0.6369 0.6097 0.0272
1998 0.5230 0.5133 0.0097 0.5192 0.4900 0.0292 0.6950 0.6668 0.0282
2000 0.5262 0.5177 0.0085 0.5294 0.5060 0.0234 0.6775 0.6491 0.0284
2002 0.5261 0.5178 0.0084 0.5066 0.4799 0.0267 0.6719 0.6451 0.0268
2004 0.5654 0.5572 0.0082 0.5588 0.5336 0.0252 0.7067 0.6815 0.0252
2006 0.6059 0.5978 0.0081 0.6261 0.5986 0.0275 0.7435 0.7202 0.0233
The table reports the labor force participation rates of different samples of women computed under different set
of rules on pension eligibility for their mothers. The pre-Amato scenario is based on the assumption that in all
years the eligibility rules are those that were in place until 1992 (i.e., before the Amato reform). The Dini
scenario is based on the assumption that in all years the more restrictive rules set by the 1995 Dini reform
apply to everyone. The column “Difference” shows the difference between the two scenarios. The three
samples considered consist of all women with children aged 0–14 (a), all women with children aged 0–5 (b),
and all women with children aged 0–14, whose mothers participated in the labor force (c). These labor force
participation probabilities are plotted in Fig. 3
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